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Abstract
Post-production services, such as sales, distribution, and maintenance, comprise
a crucial element of business activity. A foreign ﬁrm faces a higher cost to perform
such services than its domestic rival because of the lack of proximity to customers.
We explore an international duopoly model in which a foreign ﬁrm can reduce its cost
for post-production services by foreign direct investment (FDI), or alternatively can
outsource such services to its domestic rival. Trade liberalization, if not accompanied
by liberalization of service FDI, can hurt domestic consumers and decrease world
welfare, but the negative welfare impacts can be mitigated and eventually turned into
positive ones as service FDI is also liberalized. This ﬁnding yields important policy
implications, given the reality that the progress of liberalization in service sectors is
limited compared to the substantial progress already made in trade liberalization.
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11 Introduction
Business activity does not end with the production of the ﬁnal product. After production,
a variety of business activities such as marketing, sales and distribution, and the provision
of maintenance and repair services should be eﬀectively carried out to maximize the
value of products that have been produced. This is a widely held view in the strategic
management literature. Porter (1985), for example, pointed out that ﬁrms’ primary
activities can be divided into inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing
and sales, and service. In Porter’s classiﬁcation, outbound logistics means activities
associated with collecting, storing, and physically distributing the product to buyers,
marketing and sales means activities associated with providing a means by which buyers
can purchase the product and inducing them to do so, and service means activities
associated with providing service to enhance or maintain the value of the product.
In the present paper, outbound logistics, marketing and sales, and service are together
referred to as “post-production services.” A crucial strategic decision that every producer
of ﬁnal products needs to make is whether to perform post-production services by itself or
outsource (some of) them to other ﬁrms. Since proximity to customers is a crucial element
for post-production services to be carried out eﬀectively, this decision is particularly
important in the context of international trade. Foreign producers often outsource post-
production services to their domestic rivals. For example, automobiles manufactured by
foreign auto-makers are often sold and distributed by their local rivals.1 Alternatively,
foreign producers can establish local aﬃliates in the domestic market and perform post-
production services by themselves (foreign direct investment (FDI) in post-production
services).2
The objective of this paper is to analyze the provision of post-production services
in the context of international trade and to explore its welfare consequences and policy
implications.3 To this end, we explore an international duopoly model in which two ﬁrms,
1In the Japanese market, examples include Volkswagen-Toyota, Ford-Mazda, Volvo-Subaru, and
Peugeot-Suzuki, among others. The following examples are also found in Japan. (i) Several phar-
maceutical products produced by Bayer, a German ﬁrm, are sold and distributed by its Japanese rivals,
Meiji Seika and Kyorin Pharmaceutical. (ii) A Japanese liquor company, Suntory, sells wines, beers,
whiskies, brandies, liqueurs, and mineral waters made by foreign companies. (iii) Evian, a mineral water
made by French company Danone, is distributed in Japan by a Japanese beverage company, Calpis.
2For example, in the late 1980s a number of foreign auto-makers such as BMW, Chrysler, and
Mercedes-Benz established their own distribution networks in Japan.
3Our approach is fundamentally diﬀerent from the incomplete contracting approach which has been
recently applied to the analysis of vertical structures in the context of international trade. For details,
2one domestic and the other foreign, produce diﬀerentiated products in their own countries
and compete in the domestic market. Post-production services must be performed before
a product is consumed. The foreign ﬁrm has the option of outsourcing post-production
services to its domestic rival by paying royalties or providing those services by itself in
the domestic market. In the latter case, however, the variable cost for services is high
because of the lack of proximity to the domestic market. This variable cost can be
reduced if the foreign ﬁrm establishes its own service facilities in the domestic market by
incurring a ﬁxed cost for FDI. The connection between production and post-production
services, uniquely captured by our model, yields novel welfare consequences and policy
implications as outlined below.
Suppose that the tariﬀ rate is initially high, and that the ﬁxed cost for service FDI is
also initially high so that the foreign ﬁrm chooses to outsource post-production services to
its domestic rival. We ﬁnd, contrary to the conventional result, that a tariﬀ reduction may
hurt consumers and reduce world welfare. As in the standard analyses, the direct eﬀect of
a tariﬀ reduction is to beneﬁt consumers and the foreign ﬁrm, and hurt the domestic ﬁrm.
In our framework, however, the domestic ﬁrm can mitigate the negative eﬀect of a tariﬀ
reduction by raising the price it charges the foreign ﬁrm for post-production services,
and the higher service price hurts consumers. We demonstrate that, from the welfare
standpoint, the latter indirect eﬀect can overshadow the former direct eﬀect so that
the tariﬀ reduction actually hurts consumers and reduces world welfare in equilibrium.
Importantly, a reduction in the ﬁxed cost for service FDI lowers the service price charged
by the domestic ﬁrm, which in turn mitigates the negative welfare eﬀect of tariﬀ reduction
and eventually turns it into a positive eﬀect.
Multilateral negotiations under GATT/WTO have greatly facilitated the liberaliza-
tion of the trade in goods, and many countries have committed to maintain low levels
of tariﬀ rates. However, with respect to the trade in services, although the General
Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS) came into eﬀect in 1995 as a result of the
GATT Uruguay Round negotiations and has been contributing toward expanding trade
in services, the progress is still limited. For instance, only 52 WTO members have made
commitments to liberalizing distribution services under GATS (Roy, Marchetti, and Lim,
2006). The limited progress means that foreign ﬁrms may still have to incur substantial
extra costs for service FDI because of regulatory impediments.4 Melitz (2003), for ex-
see the second last paragraph of this section.
4In his recent study on restrictiveness of FDI, Golub (2003) adopted “obligatory screening and ap-
proval procedures” and “restrictions on foreign ownership” as two main restrictions, and found that FDI
3ample, pointed out that an exporting ﬁrm must set up new distribution channels in the
foreign country and conform to all the shipping rules speciﬁed by the foreign customs
agency, and that, although some of these costs cannot be avoided, others are often ma-
nipulated by governments.5,6 When restrictions on service FDI are high, foreign ﬁrms
may have to rely on service outsourcing to perform post-production services in domestic
markets. In fact, according to OECD (2001), the number of the non-equity form of new
cross-border alliances in business services increased from 25 in 1989 to 1097 in 2000.
Our analysis uncovers a previously unnoticed importance of liberalization in the ser-
vice sector. In our framework, the liberalization of the trade in services reduces the
ﬁxed cost of service FDI, and the liberalization of the trade in goods reduces the tar-
iﬀ. We demonstrate that the liberalization of the trade in goods, if not accompanied
by the liberalization of service FDI, may hurt consumers and reduce world welfare, and
that the negative welfare eﬀect is mitigated and eventually turned into a positive one
as the liberalization of service FDI makes progress. In other words, the liberalization of
service FDI can convert a welfare-reducing trade liberalization into a welfare-enhancing
trade liberalization. Interestingly, the liberalization of service FDI improves welfare even
when it does not induce the foreign ﬁrm to actually undertake service FDI, because a
reduction of the ﬁxed cost of service FDI lowers the service price that the domestic ﬁrm
can charge. We believe that these are important policy implications, given that post-
production services consist of an important subclass of services,7 and that foreign ﬁrms’
diﬃculties in undertaking post-production services in the domestic market have been
recently considered to be a serious non-tariﬀ barrier.8
Cross-border transactions of services and FDI in services have been previously stud-
restrictions on business and distribution services are higher than those on manufacturing.
5Melitz’s argument is based on a number of interviews with managers in Colombian ﬁrms making
export decisions conducted by Roberts and Tybout (1997).
6In the late 80’s, Toysrus’ retail establishment was delayed in Japan because of the Large-scale Retail
Store Low. The United States considered that its application was arbitrary and regarded the low as a
typical impediment against service FDI.
7Browning and Singelmann (1975), for example, classiﬁed services into distribution services, producer
services, social services, and personal services, recognizing distribution services (transport, storage, retail,
wholesale trade) as an important subclass of services.
8For example, in the U.S.-Japan Auto Negotiation in 1995, the U.S. government required the Japanese
government to promote the dealership of imported cars by the domestic car producers. Foreign ﬁrms’
proﬁtability will surely increase if the price they have to pay to outsource post-production services in
the local market is reduced. Our analysis, however, indicates that the liberalization of service FDI is
equally or even more important not only for increasing foreign ﬁrms’ proﬁtability but also for beneﬁting
domestic consumers and increasing world welfare.
4ied in the trade literature.9 Recently, several papers have considered market access and
distribution, an important example of post-production services, in the context of in-
ternational trade. Richardson (2004) has shown in a spatial-economy model that the
domestic government has an incentive to open the access to retail distribution to foreign
manufacturers when tariﬀs can be used, but it may limit the access when trade policy is
not available. Francois and Wooton (2007) assume that sales of imported goods require
the domestic distribution services that are supplied under imperfect competition. They
have shown that trade volumes and the level of optimal tariﬀ are positively related to
the degree of competitiveness in the service sector. In these previous models, production
and distribution of goods are assumed to be conducted in diﬀerent industries. Qiu (2006)
has developed a model to study ﬁrms’ incentives to form cross-border strategic alliances
and their choice of entry modes in foreign markets. In his two-country, multi-ﬁrm model,
each ﬁrm’s cost of distributing its products in the foreign country is assumed to become
lower when the ﬁrm forms a strategic alliance with a ﬁrm in the foreign country. It
should be noted that Qiu uses the term distribution costs to represent all costs incurred
after production, which are costs for post-production services in our terminology.
Our paper is related to the previous studies mentioned above in the sense that we
also investigate post-production services in the context of international trade. There
are, however, some fundamental diﬀerences. In our model, the foreign ﬁrm determines
whether it performs post-production services by itself or outsources them to its domestic
rival. This decision is made under the strategic interactions between the foreign ﬁrm
and the domestic ﬁrm, and their strategic interactions in the product market and the
provision of post-production services are linked in our model. This linkage, which is
uniquely explored in our analysis, in turn yields novel welfare and policy implications
for the liberalization of both the trade in goods and service FDI. To our knowledge,
our analysis is the ﬁrst attempt to examine the linkage between FDI in post-production
services and product market competition.
Also, our analysis is distinctively diﬀerent from the incomplete contracting approach
that has been recently applied to the analyses of vertical structures in the context of
international trade; see Antr´ as, 2003, 2005; Antr´ as and Helpman, 2004; Grossman and
Helpman, 2004; and Feenstra and Hanson, 2005.10 Their analyses address the choice
between vertical integration and the purchase of a specialized input through contractual
9See, for example, Djaji´ c and Kierzkowski (1989), Markusen (1989), Francois (1990), Konan and
Maskus (2006), and Wong, Wu, and Zhang (2006) for cross-border transactions of services, and Raﬀ and
von der Ruhr (2001) and Markusen, Rutherford, and Tarr (2005) for FDI in services.
10See also Spencer (2005) and Helpman (2006) for a recent survey of the literature.
5outsourcing, where relationship-speciﬁc investments governed by incomplete contracts
play a central role. In contrast, as mentioned above, we focus on the connection be-
tween production and post-production services in the context of international trade,
and examine its welfare and policy implications. Given our focus, we do not address
relation-speciﬁcity of investment and incompleteness of contracting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops an interna-
tional duopoly model that captures the linkage between FDI in post-production services
and product market competition, and derives the equilibrium of the model. Section 3
investigates the eﬀects of the liberalization of the trade in goods, the liberalization of FDI
for post-production services, and the connection between them. Section 4 elaborates on
the policy implications of our ﬁndings and explores the robustness of the results. Section
5 summarizes the paper and oﬀers concluding remarks, which include a discussion on the
diﬀerence between post-production services and intermediate inputs in our framework.
2 The Model
Demands in the home country are characterized by a representative consumer who con-
sumes non-numer´ aire goods as well as a numer´ aire good. The non-numer´ aire goods
consist of goods D and F which are imperfect substitutes. The numer´ aire good is com-
petitively produced and freely traded between countries. The indirect utility function is
given by








− bpDpF + Y, (1)
where pD and pF are the prices of good D and good F respectively, V is a positive
constant, and Y is the income in the domestic country.11 By using Roy’s identity, the
demand for each product i (∈ {D,F}) is given by
xi(pi,pj) = a − pi + bpj (i,j ∈ {D,F}, i 6= j) (2)
where a (> 0) and b ∈ [0,1) respectively represent the market size and the substitutability
of the two products. As b gets closer to one, the two products become more similar.
We consider an international duopoly model in which the domestic ﬁrm (ﬁrm D) and
the foreign ﬁrm (ﬁrm F) engage in Bertrand competition in the domestic market. Firm
D produces good D and ﬁrm F produces good F. The unit cost of producing goods is
11This indirect utility function is derived from a standard quasi-linear utility function given by
U(xD,xF,M) = α(xD + xF) − β{(xD)
2 + (xF)
2}/2 − γxDxF + M where xD and xF denote the con-
sumption of good D and that of good F respectively, and M is the consumption of the numer´ aire good.
6identical across ﬁrms and constant, and is denoted by c. An ad valorem tariﬀ, t (≥ 0),
is imposed on imports of good F.12 Post-production services must be performed for
goods to be consumed. We capture this by assuming that one unit of post-production
services must be performed for one unit of goods to be consumed. Assume that ﬁrm D
has already established its facilities to perform post-production services for good D in
the domestic market, and its unit cost for post-production services is constant and given
by cS (> 0).
Also, ﬁrm D can perform post-production services for good F at the same unit cost
cS by incurring a ﬁxed cost KD, which includes costs for suitably adjusting its facilities
and learning details on how to eﬀectively perform services for ﬁrm F’s product.13 We
assume that post-production services can be performed only by good producers (i.e.,
ﬁrms D and F) because of the economy of scope. The qualitative nature of our results is
unchanged under an alternative model set-up in which a non-producer of the good can
also perform post-production services for good F, but it must incur substantially higher
ﬁxed costs than ﬁrm D because it needs to learn the basics of the business from scratch.
See Subsection 4.2 for robustness of our results under an alternative set-up in which (i)
independent service organizations can also perform post-production services for good F
without incurring high ﬁxed costs, or (ii) more than one domestic ﬁrm exist and can
perform post-production services for good F.
On the other hand, if ﬁrm F has not established service facilities in the domestic
market, its unit service cost is cS + m (m > 0) which is higher than cS because of
the lack of proximity to domestic customers. For example, without maintenance and
repair shops in the domestic market, ﬁrm F has to ship goods back and forth between
two countries to perform maintenance and repair services, and this requires substantial
costs for shipping and handling. Similarly, without a marketing and sales subsidiary
in the domestic market, ﬁrm F’s sales representatives have to make frequent business
trips to the domestic country, requiring substantial costs for travel time, transportation
and accommodation, and travel allowances. Firm F can reduce its unit service cost
by establishing local facilities for performing post-production services in the domestic
market. In particular, we assume that, if ﬁrm F undertakes FDI in post-production
services by incurring a ﬁxed investment cost KF (> 0), its unit service cost is reduced
to cS. Note that the tariﬀ on imports is still eﬀective even if FDI in post-production
12See Subsection 4.2 for the case of speciﬁc tariﬀs.
13Although it seems natural to assume that ﬁrm D incurs the ﬁxed cost KD, the qualitative nature of
our results remain mostly unchanged under an alternative assumption that ﬁrm F incurs the ﬁxed cost
KD. See also Subsection 4.2.
7services is made, which is in contrast to “tariﬀ-jumping” FDI in production.
In sum, we consider the following three options for ﬁrm F to perform post-production
services in the domestic market: (i) No Local Facility: Firm F performs post-production
services at the unit cost cS +m without establishing its service facilities in the domestic
market; (ii) Service FDI: Firm F reduces the unit service cost to cS by incurring a
ﬁxed cost KF to establish its service facilities; or (iii) Service Outsourcing: Firm F
outsources post-production services to ﬁrm D, which incurs a ﬁxed cost KD and charges
a service price (or royalty) of r (> 0) per unit of services.
To simplify mathematical expressions, we set cS = 0.14 We can express the proﬁts of
the two ﬁrms as





− c − (1 − λ)(1 − µ)m − µr

xF(pF,pD) − λKF, (4)
where µ = 1 if ﬁrm F outsources post-production services to ﬁrm D and µ = 0 otherwise,
and λ = 1 if ﬁrm F makes service FDI and takes λ = 0 otherwise. Note that when λ = 1,
µ = 0 always holds.
The timing of the game is as follows.
[Stage 1]: Firm D determines whether to oﬀer a service price of r (> 0), to which ﬁrm D
must commit. If r is oﬀered, ﬁrm F determines whether to accept the oﬀer. We assume
that, if ﬁrm F accepts the oﬀer, it commits to outsourcing all post-production services
for good F in the domestic market. Under this assumption, we can treat three options
– no local facility, service FDI, and service outsourcing – as distinctive alternatives. If
ﬁrm F rejects the oﬀer, or ﬁrm D does not make an oﬀer, ﬁrm F determines whether
to make FDI in post-production services. See Figure 1 for a game tree that depicts the
interaction between ﬁrms D and F at Stage 1.
[Stage 2]: Firms D and F simultaneously set prices of their own products, and then
consumers make purchase decisions.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
2.1 Product market competition
In this subsection, we derive the equilibria of Stage 2 subgames. The game has three Stage
2 subgames depending on decisions made at Stage 1: (i) No Local Facility (NLF)
subgame: Firm F performs post-production services without establishing its service
14The assumption does not change the qualitative nature of our results.
8facilities at Stage 1; (ii) FDI subgame: Firm F makes FDI in post-production services
at Stage 1; (iii) Outsourcing (OS) subgame: Firm F outsources post-production
services to ﬁrm D at Stage 1.
Throughout our analysis, we assume that the value of a is large enough and the tariﬀ
rate t is small enough so that each ﬁrm i (= D, F) sells a strictly positive amount of
good i in the domestic market in the equilibrium. In particular, we assume that the
following conditions hold:
Assumption 1: a > c and t < t ≡
(2+b){a−(1−b)c}−(2−b2)m
(2−b2)(c+m) .
Let us begin with the NLF subgame and the FDI subgame. In both subgames, µ = 0
applies in equations (3) and (4). In the second stage, each ﬁrm maximizes its own proﬁts.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are given by
∂πD(pD,pF)
∂pD


















By solving these two equations, we can derive the equilibrium prices as:




b{ct + (1 + t)(1 − λ)m}
4 − b2 , (5)




2{ct + (1 + t)(1 − λ)m}
4 − b2 . (6)
Since the cost of supplying the domestic market is (weakly) higher for ﬁrm F than for
ﬁrm D, we have e pF (m,t;λ) ≥ e pD (m,t;λ). The producer price of good F is given by
e pF (m,t;λ)/(1 + t). The equilibrium sales are given by
e xD (m,t;λ) =
a − (1 − b)c
2 − b
+
b{ct + (1 − λ)(1 + t)m}
4 − b2 , (7)
e xF (m,t;λ) =





{ct + (1 − λ)(1 + t)m}
4 − b2 . (8)
Note that we have e xD (m,t;λ) > 0 and e xF (m,t;λ) > 0 by Assumption 1.
Since λ = 0 in the NLF subgame, the equilibrium prices, sales, and proﬁts in that
subgame are respectively given by pNLF
D ≡ e pD (m,t;0), pNLF
F ≡ e pF (m,t;0), xNLF
D ≡
e xD (m,t;0), xNLF
F ≡ e xF (m,t;0), πNLF
D ≡ πD(pNLF
D ,pNLF
F ) = (pNLF




D ) = {pNLF
F − (1 + t)(c + m)}2/(1 + t). Similarly, the equilibrium prices,
sales, and proﬁts in the FDI subgame are respectively given by pFDI
D ≡ e pD (m,t;1),
pFDI
F ≡ e pF (m,t;1), xFDI
D ≡ e xD (m,t;1), xFDI





D − c)2, πFDI
F ≡ πF(pFDI
F ,pFDI
D ) = {pFDI
F − (1 + t)c}2/(1 + t) − KF.
9Also, consumer surplus, domestic welfare, and world welfare in the equilibrium of
these subgames are respectively given by CSk ≡ V (pk
D,pk




F/(1 + t), and WWk ≡ Wk + πk
F, where k = NLF or FDI.
Next turn to the OS subgame, where µ = 1 and λ = 0 apply. In the remainder of
this subsection, we consider the case in which the service price r is small enough for each
ﬁrm i (= D, F) to sell a strictly positive amount of good i in the domestic market in
the equilibrium. In the second stage, each ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts with respect to its

























By solving these equations, we ﬁnd the equilibrium prices in the OS subgame as:





4 − b2 ≡ pOS
D , (9)




{2(1 + t) + b2}r + 2ct
4 − b2 ≡ pOS
F . (10)
The equilibrium consumer surplus is given by d CS (r,t) = V (pOS
D ,pOS
F )−Y ≡ CSOS, and
it is decreasing in each good’s price. Since both prices are increasing in r, a rise of the
service price reduces the equilibrium consumer surplus with given t.
Lemma 1 In the equilibrium of the Outsourcing subgame, a rise in the service price
increases the prices of both goods and reduces the consumer surplus, holding the tariﬀ
rate ﬁxed.
Proof. Since ∂pOS
j /∂r > 0 (j = {D,F}) and ∂V (pD,pF)/∂pj = −xj < 0, we have
∂CSOS/∂r < 0.
Also, we ﬁnd that the equilibrium sales are
b xD (r,t) =






r − (c + r)t}
4 − b2 ≡ xOS
D , (11)
b xF (r,t) =










4 − b2 ≡ xOS
F . (12)
Note that, given Assumption 1, xOS
D > 0 and xOS
F > 0 hold when r is small enough.
The eﬀect of an increase in r on xOS
F is always negative whereas the eﬀect on xOS
D is
10ambiguous: an increase in r shifts demands from good F to good D, but it gives ﬁrm D
an incentive to raise the price of good D. The ﬁrst eﬀect increases xOS
D , while the second
eﬀect decreases it. Thus, the overall eﬀect on xOS
D is ambiguous.
The equilibrium proﬁts of ﬁrms D and F are respectively given by
b πD(r,t) = (pOS
D − c)2 + r{pOS
F − b(pOS












F /(1 + t) ≡ WOS and [ WW(r,t) = WOS + πOS
F ≡ WWOS.
Lemma 2 In the equilibrium of the Outsourcing subgame, a rise in the service price
reduces ﬁrm F’s proﬁt and world welfare, holding the tariﬀ rate ﬁxed.
Proof. By (14) and ∂{pOS








F /∂r < 0. We also have ∂WWOS/∂r = −[(1−b2){(2+b)2(a−c+bc)+(4+






An increase in r increases ﬁrm F’s service cost and thereby decreases its proﬁt.
Although whether it increases or decreases ﬁrm D’s proﬁt and domestic welfare is am-
biguous, it necessarily decreases world welfare since its damages to consumers and ﬁrm
F always dominate the possible beneﬁts of ﬁrm D as well as domestic welfare.
2.2 Equilibrium of the entire game
We now derive the equilibrium of the entire game. For expositional simplicity, we adopt
the following tie-breaking rules: (i) If ﬁrm F is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting
a service price r oﬀered by ﬁrm D at stage 1, ﬁrm F accepts it. (ii) If ﬁrm D is indiﬀerent
between oﬀering and not oﬀering r, ﬁrm D does not oﬀer it. (iii) If ﬁrm F is indiﬀerent
between making and not making a service FDI, ﬁrm F makes it. Note that, since πFDI
F
is strictly decreasing in KF while πNLF
F is independent of KF and πFDI
F > πNLF
F holds
when KF = 0, there exists a unique value K0
F (> 0) such that πFDI
F ≥ πNLF




F if KF > K0
F.
Recall that ﬁrm F’s proﬁt in the Outsourcing subgame, b πF(r,t), is strictly decreas-
ing in the service price r. Also, if ﬁrm F does not accept r oﬀered by ﬁrm D (or if
ﬁrm D does not oﬀer any service price), then ﬁrm F’s subsequent equilibrium proﬁt is
11max[πNLF
F ,πFDI
F ], which is independent of r. This implies that ﬁrm F accepts service
price r at Stage 1 if and only if r ≤ ¯ r holds, where ¯ r (> 0) denotes the maximum accept-
able service price. Note that ¯ r is uniquely determined by b πF(¯ r,t) = max[πNLF
F ,πFDI
F ].
Assumption 1 implies max[πNLF
F ,πFDI
F ] > 0, and hence b πF(¯ r,t) > 0. This in turn im-
plies that each ﬁrm i (= D, F) sells a strictly positive amount of good i in the domestic
market in the equilibrium of the Outsourcing subgame for all r ∈ [0, ¯ r].


























D − c) − (1 + t)(c + r)

. (15)
Since an increase in r raises pOS
F and thereby raises pOS
D , it increases ﬁrm D’s proﬁts
in the product market. The ﬁrst term of (15) represents this strategic eﬀect and it is
positive. Although an increase in r increases ﬁrm D’s per unit proﬁt from performing
post-production services for ﬁrm F, it also decreases the imports of good F. Hence, the
change in ﬁrm D’s proﬁt from performing post-production services for ﬁrm F, represented
in the sum of the second and the third terms, has an ambiguous sign.
In what follows, we focus our analysis on the range of parameterizations in which
∂πOS
D /∂r > 0 holds for all r ≤ ¯ r. Under this condition, if ﬁrm D oﬀers its service price
so that the oﬀer is accepted by ﬁrm F, ﬁrm D oﬀers the maximum acceptable price
r = ¯ r. This condition is satisﬁed when the market size, a, is suﬃciently large, or the
substitutability of products, b, is suﬃciently high.15
We classify the equilibrium of the entire game as follows: (i) No Local Facility
(NLF) equilibrium: Firm F performs post-production services without establishing its
service facilities in the domestic market at Stage 1; (ii) FDI equilibrium: Firm F makes
FDI in post-production services in the domestic market at Stage 1; (iii) Outsourcing
(OS) equilibrium: Firm F outsources post-production services to ﬁrm D at Stage 1.
Proposition 1 characterizes the equilibrium, and Figure 2 provides a diagrammatic
representation of the proposition.
Proposition 1 The game has a unique equilibrium for any given parameterization.
There exists a threshold K0
D such that the equilibrium is characterized by (i) and (ii)
below.
15See the Appendix for details. We have found that the qualitative nature of the results is mostly
unchanged without imposing this condition. Without this condition, however, the analysis becomes
substantially complex without adding new insights.
12(i) Suppose KF ≤ K0
F. Then the equilibrium is an Outsourcing equilibrium if KD ≤ K0
D
and an FDI equilibrium if KD > K0
D, where K0
D is strictly increasing in KF for all
KF ∈ (0,K0
F].
(ii) Suppose KF > K0
F. Then the equilibrium is an Outsourcing equilibrium if KD ≤ K0
D
and a No Local Facility equilibrium if KD > K0
D, where K0
D is independent of KF for
all KF > K0
F.
Proof: See Appendix.
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
Proposition 1 and Figure 2 can be explained as follows: First consider the case of
KF ≤ K0
F, which implies πFDI
F ≥ πNLF
F . The maximum acceptable service price ¯ r is
then determined by b πF(¯ r,t) = πFDI




α2 − (4 − b2)
2 (1 + t)KF
(2 − b2)t + 2(1 − b2)
(16)
where α ≡ (2 + b){a−(1 − b)c}−
 
2 − b2
ct. If ˆ πD(¯ r,t) > πFDI
D , ﬁrm D oﬀers r = ¯ r at
Stage 1, and the equilibrium of the entire game is an Outsourcing equilibrium. On the
other hand, if ˆ πD(¯ r,t) ≤ πFDI
D , ﬁrm D does not oﬀer r at Stage 1, and the equilibrium
is an FDI equilibrium. Given that b πD(¯ r,t) is strictly decreasing in KD while πFDI
D is
independent of KD, there exists a threshold, denoted K0
D, such that ˆ πD(¯ r,t) > πFDI
D if
KD < K0
D, while ˆ πD(¯ r,t) ≤ πFDI
D otherwise. We have that the threshold K0
D is strictly
increasing in KF for all KF ∈ (0,K0
F]: as the ﬁxed cost of service FDI, KF, increases, the
maximum acceptable service price ¯ r increases. This in turn increases ˆ πD(¯ r,t), resulting
in an increase in the threshold K0
D.
Next consider the case of KF > K0
F. This implies πFDI
F < πNLF
F , and hence ¯ r is
determined by b πF(¯ r,t) = πNLF
F , which gives
¯ r =
(2 − b2)(1 + t)m
(2 − b2)t + 2(1 − b2)
≡ ˆ r(m,t). (17)
Through an analogous procedure, we ﬁnd that, if KD < K0
D, b πD(¯ r,t) > πNLF
D holds
and the equilibrium is an Outsourcing equilibrium, while, if KD ≥ K0
D, b πD(¯ r,t) ≤ πNLF
D
holds and the equilibrium is a No Local Facility equilibrium. In this case, ¯ r is independent
of KF (because πNLF
F is independent of KF), which implies that the threshold K0
D is
independent of KF. Note that the threshold K0
D, when it is viewed as a function of
KF, is discontinuous at KF = K0
F (see Figure 2). This is because the value of ﬁrm D’s
13outside option jumps up from πFDI
D to πNLF
D while its gains from service outsourcing
increase continuously as KF increases (see Appendix for details).
The following Corollary is useful for the analysis in the next section.
Corollary 1 For any given KD < K0
D|KF=K0
F, there exists a value K00
F ∈ (0,K0
F) such
that the equilibrium is an Outsourcing equilibrium if KF ∈ (K00
F,K0
F) while it is an FDI
equilibrium if KF ∈ (0,K00
F].
3 Liberalization of goods trade and service FDI
This section investigates the eﬀects of the liberalization of the trade in goods, liberal-
ization of FDI for post-production services, and the connection between them. In our
analysis, trade liberalization is represented by a reduction in the tariﬀ rate, t, and lib-
eralization of service FDI is represented by a reduction in the ﬁxed cost of service FDI,
KF. Let t0 ∈ (0,¯ t] denote the tariﬀ rate before trade liberalization, and K0
F (> 0) denote
the ﬁxed cost of service FDI before liberalization of service FDI. Assume that K0
F > K0
F
for all t ∈ [0,t0].16 That is, the pre-liberalization level of KF is so high that, if ﬁrm D
does not oﬀer service price r at Stage 1, ﬁrm F does not invest in service FDI in the
subsequent equilibrium for any given t ∈ [0,t0].
As mentioned in the Introduction, the trade liberalization of goods has recently made
substantial progress through multilateral negotiations under GATT/WTO, while the
progress of liberalization in service sectors has been slow so far. Given this, we ﬁrst
investigate the eﬀects of tariﬀ reduction, holding KF ﬁxed at the pre-liberalization level
K0
F. We then investigate the eﬀects of the liberalization of service FDI, showing that
the liberalization of service FDI can convert a welfare-reducing trade liberalization into
a welfare-enhancing trade liberalization. Also, in Subsection 3.3 we analyze the eﬀects
of tariﬀ reduction when KF is endogenously determined, and consider the eﬀects of the
liberalization of service FDI in this setup.
3.1 Outsourcing equilibrium as the pre-liberalization equilibrium
In this subsection, we consider the case of KD < K0
D|t=t0, so that the pre-liberalization
equilibrium is an Outsourcing equilibrium. We ﬁnd that K0
D is strictly decreasing in
16We ﬁnd that K
0
F is strictly decreasing in t for all t ∈ [0,¯ t] (see the proof of Proposition 1 in the





14t for all t ∈ [0,¯ t] if KF > K0
F.17 Hence, KD < K0
D|t=t0 implies that KD < K0
D for
all t ∈ [0,t0]. That is, holding KF ﬁxed at K0
F, the equilibrium of the game is an
Outsourcing equilibrium for all t ∈ [0,t0]. In Figure 3, Point A represents the pre-
liberalization equilibrium that we consider in this subsection, where the shifts of K0
D and
K0
F depict eﬀects of tariﬀ reduction.18 The case of KD > K0
D|t=t0 (Point B in Figure 3)
will be discussed in the next subsection.
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
First, we ﬁx KF at K0
F and investigate the eﬀects of tariﬀ reduction. Since the
equilibrium of the game with KF = K0
F is an Outsourcing equilibrium for all t ∈ [0,t0],
the equilibrium prices of goods D and F are pOS
D and pOS
F respectively, and ﬁrm D





{(2 − b2)t + 2(1 − b2)}2 < 0
for all t ∈ [0,t0]. That is, holding KF = K0
F ﬁxed, the trade liberalization of goods
increases the equilibrium service price charged by ﬁrm D.
The logic behind this result can be explained as follows. Consider an Outsourcing
subgame. Suppose good D’s price is lowered, holding good F’s price as ﬁxed. Firm D’s
proﬁt from performing post-production services for ﬁrm F then becomes lower, because
ﬁrm F sells less due to good D’s lower price. Because of this eﬀect, ﬁrm D’s incentive
to increase its sales by lowering good D’s price is weaker in the Outsourcing subgame
than in the No Local Facility subgame. This implies that product market competition
becomes weaker if ﬁrm F outsources post-production services by accepting a service price
r oﬀered by ﬁrm D if r is suﬃciently high.19
Now suppose ﬁrm D oﬀers r = m; that is, the service price r is equal to ﬁrm F’s
unit cost for performing post-production services without establishing local facilities.
If ﬁrm F rejects this oﬀer, its unit service cost is m since ﬁrm F does not invest in
service FDI given KF = K0
F > K0
F. Firm F is then strictly better oﬀ by accepting the
oﬀer r = m, because service outsourcing at r ≥ m weakens product market competition.
Consequently, ﬁrm F accepts r = ˆ r(m,t) > m in the equilibrium, and this in turn implies




D is decreasing in t for all t ∈ [0,t0] (see the proof of Proposition 1 in
the Appendix). If KF < K
0
F, on the other hand, K
0
D is either decreasing or increasing in t.
18Figure 3 depicts the case in which K
0
D is decreasing in t for KF < K
0
F. The qualitative nature of the
results would be unchanged if K
0
D is increasing in t for KF < K
0
F.
19For product market competition to become weaker, r ≥ m is suﬃcient but not necessary. That is,
even if r < m, product market competition can still become weaker when r is suﬃciently close to m.
15that the equilibrium price of good F, pOS
F , is higher than the price ﬁrm F would charge in
the equilibrium of the No Local Facility subgame, pNLF
F . That is, we have pOS
F > pNLF
F
because service outsourcing at the service price r = ˆ r(m,t) weakens product market
competition.
Let us now turn to the eﬀect of a tariﬀ reduction from t to t − ∆ on the equilibrium
service price. In general, the burden of ad valorem tariﬀ increases with the price level.
That is, given pOS
F /(1+t) > pNLF
F /(1+t), a tariﬀ reduction increases ﬁrm F’s producer
price, and consequently ﬁrm F’s proﬁt as well, more in the OS equilibrium than in the
NLF equilibrium, holding the service price r = ˆ r(m,t) ﬁxed. In other words, a tariﬀ
reduction beneﬁts ﬁrm F more in the Outsourcing equilibrium than in the No Local
Facility equilibrium. This increases the maximum acceptable service price, and ﬁrm D
can increase the service price r from r = ˆ r(m,t) to r = ˆ r(m,t − ∆) in order to absorb a
part of ﬁrm F’s gain from the tariﬀ reduction.
We call this eﬀect the proﬁt-absorbing motive of a service price change, which results
in ∂ˆ r(m,t)/∂t < 0. Note that ˆ r(m,t) is convex in t, so the degree of an increase in
ˆ r(m,t) by a tariﬀ reduction gets larger as the initial tariﬀ rate gets smaller.
Concerning the eﬀects of tariﬀ reduction on equilibrium consumer prices pOS
D and
pOS
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Since ∂ˆ r(m,t)/∂t < 0, the signs of the above equations are ambiguous. Although a tariﬀ
reduction directly reduces the commodity prices by reducing costs of ﬁrm F, it raises
them through the indirect eﬀect caused by an increase in the service price. If the latter
eﬀect dominates the former, a tariﬀ reduction increases equilibrium consumer prices.
This can indeed be the case, as shown by Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 Holding KF ﬁxed at K0
F, there exist critical values t0 (> 0), b0 (> 0), and ζ0
(> 0) such that ∂pOS
D /∂t < 0 holds if and only if t < t0, b > b0, and c/m < ζ0. There
also exist critical values t00(< t0), b00(> b0), and ζ00(< ζ0) such that ∂pOS
D /∂t < 0 and
∂pOS
F /∂t < 0 hold if and only if t < t00, b > b00, and c/m < ζ00.
Lemma 3 indicates that, if KF is ﬁxed at K0
F, a tariﬀ reduction may hurt consumers
and reduce world welfare by increasing equilibrium consumer prices. Proposition 2 for-
malizes this by investigating how the trade liberalization of goods, if not accompanied
16by the liberalization of FDI for post-production services, aﬀects consumers, world wel-
fare, and ﬁrms’ proﬁtability. In what follows, let CS(KF,t), WW(KF,t), πD(KF,t), and
πF(KF,t), respectively, denote consumer surplus, world welfare, ﬁrm D’s proﬁt, and ﬁrm
F’s proﬁt in the equilibrium of the entire game. Note that, since both πNLF
F and πFDI
F
are decreasing in t and πF(KF,t) = max[πNLF
F ,πFDI
F ] in equilibrium, ∂πF(KF,t)/∂t < 0
always holds.
Proposition 2 Holding KF ﬁxed at K0
F, there exists a range of parameterizations in
which a tariﬀ reduction hurts consumers, decreases world welfare, and beneﬁts ﬁrm D.
More precisely, ∂CS(KF,t)/∂t > 0, ∂WW(KF,t)/∂t > 0, and ∂πD(KF,t)/∂t < 0 hold
if t < t00, b > b00, and c/m < ζ00.
Holding KF ﬁxed at K0
F, a tariﬀ reduction induces ﬁrm D to increase its service price
driven by the proﬁt-absorbing motive, and Lemma 3 tells us that this can in turn increase
equilibrium consumer prices. This is the driving force of the negative welfare eﬀects of
the trade liberalization of goods when it is not accompanied by the liberalization of
service FDI. In particular, Proposition 2 tells us that a tariﬀ reduction necessarily hurts
consumers, decreases world welfare, and beneﬁts ﬁrm D, if it increases equilibrium prices
of both goods D and F (i.e., if t < t00, b > b00, and c/m < ζ00).20 Note that this condition
is suﬃcient but not necessary. The negative welfare eﬀects may persist when a tariﬀ
reduction increases good D’s price but decreases good F’s price. That is, consumers are
worse oﬀ when the negative eﬀect of the tariﬀ reduction due to an increase in good D’s
price outweighs its positive eﬀects because of a decrease in good F’s price.21
Next we consider the eﬀects of the liberalization of service FDI, represented by a
reduction in KF from K0
F, holding the tariﬀ rate ﬁxed. Since KD < K0
D for all t ∈ [0,t0],
Corollary 1 tells us (see also Figures 2 and 3) that for any given t ∈ [0,t0], there exists
a value K00
F ∈ [0,K0
F) such that the equilibrium of the entire game is an Outsourcing
equilibrium if KF > K00
F and an FDI equilibrium if KF ≤ K00
F.
Proposition 3 tells us that, holding the tariﬀ rate ﬁxed, liberalization of service FDI
beneﬁts consumers, increases world welfare, and hurts ﬁrm D, at least weakly. See Figure
4 for a diagrammatic representation of the proposition.
20In international oligopoly models, import tariﬀs have strategic eﬀects that cause rent-shifting, and
hence the welfare of domestic country, W(KF,t), can be either increasing or decreasing in t even if
∂CS(KF,t)/∂t > 0 holds. Since ∂πF(KF,t)/∂t < 0 is always satisﬁed, however, ∂W(KF,t)/∂t > 0
holds whenever ∂WW(KF,t)/∂t > 0 holds.
21Also, even when a tariﬀ reduction decreases the prices of both goods D and F, ﬁrm D’s proﬁt may
still increase because of the higher service price it can charge.
17Proposition 3 For any given t ∈ [0,t0], CS(KF,t), WW(KF,t), and πF(KF,t) are
decreasing in KF while πD(KF,t) is increasing in KF for all KF ∈ (0,K0
F], with the
following properties:
(i) ∂CS(KF,t)/∂KF = 0 for all KF < K00
F, ∂CS(KF,t)/∂KF < 0 for all KF ∈
(K00
F,K0
F), and ∂CS(KF,t)/∂KF = 0 for all KF > K0
F.
(ii) ∂WW(KF,t)/∂KF < 0 for all KF < K00
F, ∂WW(KF,t)/∂KF < 0 for all KF ∈
(K00
F,K0
F), and ∂WW(KF,t)/∂KF = 0 for all KF > K0
F.
(iii) ∂πF(KF,t)/∂KF < 0 for all KF < K00
F, ∂πF(KF,t)/∂KF < 0 for all KF ∈
(K00
F,K0
F), and ∂πF(KF,t)/∂KF = 0 for all KF > K0
F.
(iv) ∂πD(KF,t)/∂KF = 0 for all KF < K00
F, ∂πD(KF,t)/∂KF > 0 for all KF ∈
(K00
F,K0
F), and ∂πD(KF,t)/∂KF = 0 for all KF > K0
F.
[Insert Figure 4 around here]
A reduction in KF has pro-competitive eﬀects when it reduces the equilibrium ser-
vice price ¯ r charged by ﬁrm D because a reduction in the service price intensiﬁes the
competition between ﬁrms D and F in the product market. Recall that πFDI
F ≥ πNLF
F
if and only if KF ≤ K0
F. If KF ∈ (K00
F,K0
F], a reduction in KF increases πFDI
F , which
in turn decreases the maximum acceptable service price ¯ r because ¯ r is determined by
b πF(¯ r,t) = πFDI
F in this case. Hence a reduction in KF beneﬁts consumers and increases
world welfare in the interval (K00
F,K0
F].22 It is interesting to note that, in this interval, a
reduction in KF yields pro-competitive consequences even though the reduction in KF
does not induce ﬁrm F to actually invest in service FDI in the equilibrium. At KF = K00
F,
ﬁrm F invests in service FDI, and this increases the consumer surplus and world welfare
in a discontinuous manner (see Figure 4). Beyond this point, further reduction in KF
in the interval (0,K00
F) has no eﬀects on ﬁrm D’s proﬁt and consumer surplus, though it
increases world welfare by increasing ﬁrm F’s proﬁt.
We now explore the connection between trade liberalization of goods and liberal-
ization of service FDI. Proposition 2 tells us that there exists a range of parameteriza-





0 ≤ t1 < t0 ≤ ¯ t. That is, holding KF ﬁxed at K0
F, trade liberalization represented by
the reduction in tariﬀ rate from t0 to t1 can hurt consumers and reduce world welfare.
Proposition 4 below tells us that the negative welfare eﬀects of the tariﬀ reduction from




F], a reduction in KF has no impacts, because ¯ r is determined by b πF(¯ r,t) =
π
NLF
F , where a change in KF has no eﬀect on this equation.
18t0 to t1 disappear and turn into positive ones when KF is reduced to a suﬃciently low
level by the liberalization of service FDI.





F,t0) hold, where 0 ≤ t1 < t0 ≤ ¯ t. Note that K0
F and K00
F
are evaluated at t = t1 in (i) and (ii) below.
(i) There exists a unique ˜ KCS
F ∈ [K00
F,K0
F) such that CS(KF,t1) > CS(KF,t0) for all
KF ∈ (0, ˜ KCS
F ), where K00
F < ˜ KCS
F holds under a range of parameterizations.
(ii) There exists a unique ˜ KWW
F ∈ [K00
F,K0
F) such that WW(KF,t1) > WW(KF,t0) for
all KF ∈ (0, ˜ KWW
F ), where K00
F < ˜ KWW
F holds under a range of parameterizations.
The logic behind Proposition 4 can be explained as follows: Let us consider what hap-
pens when liberalization of service FDI reduces KF from KF = K0
F. The reduction does
not aﬀect the equilibrium service price and has no welfare eﬀects, as long as KF > K0
F
holds. Once KF becomes smaller than K0
F, further reduction in KF reduces the maxi-
mum acceptable service price ¯ r, resulting in a lower equilibrium service price. The lower
service price intensiﬁes the competition between ﬁrms D and F in the product market,
mitigating the negative welfare eﬀects of tariﬀ reduction. Interestingly, the liberalization
of service FDI can convert a welfare-reducing tariﬀ reduction into a welfare-enhancing
tariﬀ reduction even if the reduction of KF does not induce ﬁrm F to actually make ser-
vice FDI. In particular, if KF is reduced from KF = K0
F to KF ∈ (K00
F,min[ ˜ KCS
F , ˜ KWW
F ]),
then the tariﬀ reduction from t0 to t1 beneﬁts consumers and increase world welfare even
though KF is not low enough for ﬁrm F to make service FDI.
As Proposition 5 below tells us, when the liberalization of service FDI reduces KF
to a suﬃciently low level so that ﬁrm F actually makes service FDI in the equilibrium,
any tariﬀ reduction has positive welfare eﬀects.
Proposition 5 Under an FDI equilibrium, a tariﬀ reduction necessarily beneﬁts con-
sumers, hurts ﬁrm D, and increases world welfare. More precisely, ∂CS (KF,t)/∂t < 0,
∂πD (KF,t)/∂t > 0, and ∂WW (KF,t)/∂t < 0 hold for all KF < K00
F.
3.2 No Local Facility equilibrium as the pre-liberalization equilibrium
This subsection discusses the case of KD > K0
D|t=t0, so that the pre-liberalization equilib-
rium is a No Local Facility equilibrium. As in the previous section, consider a reduction
19in tariﬀ from t0 to t1 (0 ≤ t1 < t0 ≤ ¯ t), holding KF ﬁxed at K0
F. There are two sub-
cases. One subcase is KD > K0
D|t=t1 (> K0
D|t=t0), where trade liberalization does not
change the nature of the equilibrium. That is, the equilibrium of the game is a No Local
Facility equilibrium not only before but also after the tariﬀ reduction. In the No Local
Facility equilibrium, ﬁrm F does not outsource post-production services to ﬁrm D, and
hence the proﬁt-absorbing motive of a service price change, which was identiﬁed in the
previous subsection as the source of the negative welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization, is
not relevant here. This implies that trade liberalization has standard welfare eﬀects of
beneﬁting consumers and increasing world welfare in this subcase.
The other subcase is K0
D|t=t1 > KD > K0
D|t=t0, where trade liberalization changes
the nature of the equilibrium from a No Local Facility equilibrium to an Outsourcing
equilibrium (see Point B in Figure 3). Recall that outsourcing of post-production services
weakens the competition between ﬁrms D and F in the product market. Because of
this eﬀect, we ﬁnd that the tariﬀ reduction from t0 to t1 can have negative welfare
eﬀects as depicted in Figure 5. As in Proposition 4, the negative welfare eﬀects of
trade liberalization disappear and turn into positive ones when trade liberalization is
accompanied by the liberalization of service FDI.
[Insert Figure 5 around here]
3.3 Eﬀects of trade liberalization with endogenous FDI costs
Thus far we have explored the eﬀects of liberalization of goods trade and service FDI by
treating the tariﬀ rate and the ﬁxed cost of service FDI as exogenous variables. As dis-
cussed in the Introduction, many countries have committed to maintain low levels of tariﬀ
rates under GATT/WTO multilateral agreements. Consequently, for many countries it
is no longer possible to use tariﬀs as ﬂexible policy instruments to enhance domestic
welfare. In contrast, concerning service FDI, the limited progress of GATS means that
countries can still manipulate the inﬂows of service FDI by raising the levels of regula-
tory impediments. In this subsection, we investigate the eﬀects of trade liberalization (a
reduction of tariﬀ rate from t0 to t1) with endogenous FDI costs by assuming that the do-
mestic government chooses KF to maximize the domestic welfare under the exogenously
given level of tariﬀ rate t. We shall then consider the eﬀects of the liberalization of service
FDI, and demonstrate that the qualitative nature of our results remains unchanged in
this setup.
Suppose that, before Stage 1, the domestic government chooses the level of KF at
20Stage 0, taking the tariﬀ rate t as given. For any given t ∈ (0,¯ t], there exists a unique level
of KF, denoted by K∗
F(t), that the domestic government chooses to maximize domestic
welfare in the equilibrium. Given the pre-liberalization level of tariﬀ rate t0 ∈ (0,¯ t],
the domestic government chooses KF = K∗
F(t0) at Stage 0. Parallel to our analysis
in Subsection 3.1, in what follows we consider the case in which the pre-liberalization
equilibrium (that is, the equilibrium under t = t0 and KF = K∗
F(t0)) is an Outsourcing
equilibrium. The qualitative nature of our results are mostly unchanged under cases in
which the pre-liberalization equilibrium is an FDI equilibrium or an NLF equilibrium.
Proposition 6 There exists a range of parameterizations in which






where 0 ≤ t1 < t0 ≤ ¯ t.
Proposition 6 tells us that liberalization of goods trade can have negative welfare
eﬀects. Suppose that the tariﬀ rate is reduced from t0 to t1. If KF is ﬁxed at K∗
F(t0),
a result similar to Proposition 2 holds; that is, the tariﬀ reduction can hurt consumers
and decrease world welfare under a range of parameterizations. In response to the tariﬀ
reduction, the domestic government changes KF from K∗
F(t0) to K∗
F(t1) to maximize
domestic welfare. Proposition 3 tells us that, holding t = t1 ﬁxed, equilibrium consumer
surplus is decreasing in KF while ﬁrm D’s equilibrium proﬁt is increasing in KF. We
also ﬁnd that the equilibrium tariﬀ revenue can be either increasing or decreasing in (or a
non-monotone function of) KF. Hence the relationship between domestic welfare and KF
is ambiguous, and it depends on parameterizations.23 We have found that the domestic
government may increase KF in response to the tariﬀ reduction, or may decrease it but
not to a low enough level that induces ﬁrm F to actually invest in service FDI. In such
cases, the tariﬀ reduction can hurt consumers and decrease world welfare.





F(t0),t0) hold, where 0 ≤ t1 < t0 ≤ ¯ t. Note that K00
F is
evaluated at t = t1 in (i) and (ii) below.
(i) There exists a unique ˆ KCS
F ∈ [K00
F,K∗
F(t1)) such that CS(KF,t1) > CS(K∗
F(t0),t0)
for all KF ∈ (0, ˆ KCS
F ), where K00
F < ˆ KCS
F holds under a range of parameterizations.
23In international oligopoly models, any policy that increases foreign ﬁrms’ operation costs generates
strategic eﬀects that cause rent-shifting, and hence such a policy tends to result in ambiguous welfare
eﬀects in each country.
21(ii) There exists a unique ˆ KWW
F ∈ [K00
F,K∗
F(t1)) such that WW(KF,t1) > WW(K∗
F(t0),t0)
for all KF ∈ (0, ˆ KWW
F ), where K00
F < ˆ KWW
F holds under a range of parameterizations.
Proposition 7 is parallel to Proposition 4, telling us that the negative welfare eﬀects
of trade liberalization disappear and turn into positive ones when trade liberalization
is accompanied by the liberalization of service FDI. A necessary condition for the tariﬀ
reduction to hurt consumers and decrease world welfare is K∗
F(t1) > K00
F; that is, the
domestic government sets the level of KF at a relatively high level so that ﬁrm F does not
invest in service FDI. Proposition 7 tells us that, by forcing the domestic government to
reduce KF, multilateral negotiations such as GATS can increase world welfare as well as
consumer surplus (see Proposition 3), and convert a welfare-reducing trade liberalization
into a welfare-enhancing trade liberalization.
4 Discussion
We have shown that the liberalization of trade in goods could hurt consumers, reduce
world welfare, and beneﬁt the domestic ﬁrm when the foreign ﬁrm outsources post-
production services to the domestic rival ﬁrm, but that a reduction in the ﬁxed cost of
service FDI can mitigate and eventually eliminate these anti-competitive eﬀects of trade
liberalization. In this section, we ﬁrst discuss the policy implications of our results, and
then explore the robustness of our results under several alternative modelling choices.24
4.1 Policy implications
Through multilateral negotiations under GATT/WTO, countries have been lowering the
barriers for the trade in goods. Growing attention is now being paid to the market access
of foreign ﬁrms in the service sector. The GATT Uruguay Round negotiations succeeded
in establishing the framework of liberalizing cross-country transactions of services, that is,
the GATS. The actual degree of liberalization, however, has been relatively small. For
instance, only 52 WTO members have made commitments to liberalizing distribution
services under GATS (Roy, Marchetti, and Lim, 2006). Under the limited progress of
liberalization in the service sector, many foreign ﬁrms still face signiﬁcantly high costs
for service FDI, which prevent them from establishing local service facilities to perform
post-production services by themselves in the local market.
24Detailed analyses of the robustness of our results are available upon request.
22In our theoretical framework, the current state of the world corresponds to a situation
in which the tariﬀ rate t is reduced to a reasonably low level but the ﬁxed cost for service
FDI, KF, is still high. Our comparative statics results then suggest that further progress
of trade liberalization under GATT/WTO may hurt consumers and decrease world wel-
fare, if it is not accompanied by the liberalization of service FDI. Our analysis uncovers a
previously unnoticed importance of liberalization of service FDI in its connection to trade
liberalization. That is, the liberalization of service FDI is important not only because it
reduces per-unit costs of post-production services but also because it recovers the gains
from the trade liberalization of goods for both consumers and world welfare. We have also
found that the qualitative nature of the results remains unchanged under an alternative
setup in which, without the liberalization of service FDI, KF is endogenously determined
by the domestic government. Therefore, making progress on the liberalization of service
FDI under GATS is crucial to secure positive welfare consequences of trade liberalization
under GATT/WTO. Since the anti-competitive eﬀects of trade liberalization are more
likely as the tariﬀ becomes lower (see Proposition 2), the liberalization of service FDI
becomes more important as trade liberalization proceeds.
Recently, many regional trade agreements (RTAs) have established codes for the lib-
eralization in the service sector in addition to those for the liberalization of the trade in
goods. In these RTAs, some countries have undertaken further commitments on the lib-
eralization of FDI in post-production services on top of the existing GATS commitments.
For instance, in its RTA with Australia, Thailand allows Australian ﬁrms 100% foreign
equity ownership for distribution of their products, even though it limits foreign equity
ownership up to 49% in its GATS distribution commitments.25 Singapore made broader
commitments on the retailing of certain goods in its RTAs with the US, Australia, and
Korea. Our analysis indicates that RTAs with deeper commitments towards the lib-
eralization of service FDI are more likely to make trade liberalization pro-competitive,
suggesting that the recent proliferation of RTAs may be superior to multilateral liberal-
ization under GATT/WTO.
Our model also yields a new policy implication regarding foreign producers’ accessi-
bility to service outsourcing in the local market. Suppose that the values of KF and KD
are initially high so that the model exhibits a No Local Facility equilibrium, and that
25Oman has also undertaken similar commitments in its RTA with the US. Many countries which had
no GATS commitments in distribution services, such as Bahrain, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Morocco, and Nicaragua have undertaken commitments
in distribution services in their RTAs with the US. See Roy, Marchetti, and Lim (2006) for details.
23the domestic government implements a policy to reduce KD, ﬁrm D’s ﬁxed cost for per-
forming post-production services for ﬁrm F. A suﬃcient reduction of KD switches the
equilibrium to an Outsourcing equilibrium, in which ﬁrm D charges a service price that
is higher than m, product-market competition becomes weaker, and consumer surplus
and world welfare both become lower than in the No Local Facility equilibrium. Our
model therefore oﬀers a warning to the government on the possibility that such a policy
may result in negative welfare consequences unless it is accompanied by the liberalization
of service FDI.
We end this subsection by commenting on horizontal FDI. Since horizontal FDI in
production to serve the local market ‘jumps’ tariﬀs, it has the same eﬀect as a tariﬀ
elimination. In our model, the tariﬀ elimination may hurt consumers and reduce world
welfare if it is not accompanied by the liberalization of service FDI. Our ﬁndings therefore
indicate that, to secure its positive welfare consequences, the liberalization of FDI in
production should be accompanied by the liberalization of service FDI.
4.2 Robustness
Bargaining power: The assumption that ﬁrm D makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer gives
ﬁrm D all the bargaining power to set the service price. The qualitative nature of our
results would remain unchanged under more general bargaining procedures in which the
two ﬁrms share the surplus from service outsourcing, as long as ﬁrm D has suﬃciently
strong bargaining power. Recall that, in the Outsourcing equilibrium, ﬁrm D oﬀers
the maximum acceptable service price r = ¯ r at which ﬁrm F is indiﬀerent between
outsourcing the post-production services and performing the services by itself. If ¯ r is
suﬃciently high, a tariﬀ reduction can increase the equilibrium service price through the
logic presented in Subsection 3.1 (see the third to ﬁfth paragraph of the subsection), and
this eﬀect is the driving force of our main comparative results presented in Propositions
2 to 5. If the two ﬁrms share the surplus through bargaining, the equilibrium service
price, ˆ r, is less than ¯ r and decreasing in ﬁrm F’s bargaining power. However, as long as
ﬁrm D’s bargaining power is suﬃciently strong, ˆ r takes a suﬃciently high value so that a
tariﬀ reduction still increases the equilibrium service price. Then, our main results hold
under a more general bargaining set-up in a range of parameterizations.
More than one domestic ﬁrms: We have analyzed the strategic interaction between
ﬁrms D and F by assuming that only one ﬁrm can produce the ﬁnal good in the domestic
country. One can consider an alternative set-up in which N (≥ 2) symmetric domestic
24ﬁrms, indexed by D1, D2, ..., DN, produce diﬀerentiated products. In the presence
of more than one domestic ﬁrm, the qualitative nature of our main results remains
unchanged if ﬁrm F negotiates prices for service outsourcing with one domestic ﬁrm at a
time in a sequential fashion. In particular, suppose that ﬁrm F ﬁrst negotiates with ﬁrm
D1 on service prices, and, if ﬁrm F decides not to outsource services to ﬁrm D1, then
ﬁrm F performs services by itself (No Local Facility or Service FDI) or negotiates with
ﬁrm D2, and so on.26 In the product-market competition stage, N + 1 ﬁrms compete
in a Bertrand fashion under diﬀerentiated oligopoly. We ﬁnd that the alternative model
has a unique pure-strategy equilibrium, which is a No Local Facility equilibrium, an FDI
equilibrium, or an Outsourcing equilibrium, depending on parameterizations. In the
Outsourcing equilibrium, the equilibrium service price ˆ r can increase as tariﬀ is reduced,
and our main comparative statics results hold under a range of parameterizations.
Alternatively, suppose that domestic ﬁrms simultaneously oﬀer service prices, and
ﬁrm F accepts one oﬀer or rejects all oﬀers. There exists no pure strategy equilibrium
in this case since domestic ﬁrms incur KD in providing services (see Sharkey and Sibley,
1993). Each ﬁrm chooses the probability of oﬀering service prices in a mixed strategy
equilibrium, and the case in which only one ﬁrm oﬀers the maximum acceptable service
price r = r remains an equilibrium with a positive probability. Also, if domestic ﬁrms
have diﬀerent per-unit costs for performing post-production services for ﬁrm F, there
exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in which a domestic ﬁrm oﬀers r = ¯ r when the domestic
ﬁrm’s cost is substantially lower than other domestic ﬁrms’ costs.
Independent service organizations: Our model assumes that post-production ser-
vices can be performed only by goods producers (ﬁrms D and F) because of economy of
scope. Alternatively, suppose that several independent service organizations (ISOs) can
also perform post-production services for ﬁrm F at constant marginal cost k (≥ 0), and
for simplicity assume that their ﬁxed costs are zero. In this alternative set-up, ﬁrm F
has an option of outsourcing services to an ISO at the per-unit service price of k. The
logical structure of this alternative set-up is identical to the one of the base model if
k = m, and they are similar as long as k > 0, implying that the qualitative nature of
our results remains unchanged in this alternative set-up as long as k > 0. Also, the free
26The sequential set-up can be regarded as approximating the following scenario, which we feel is fairly
realistic: When a foreign ﬁrm attempts to outsource post-production services to one of its domestic rivals,
the foreign ﬁrm needs to identify a candidate ﬁrm by incurring search costs, and negotiate the terms of
service outsourcing with the candidate. If the negotiation is unsuccessful, the ﬁrm will identify another
candidate to negotiate with.
25entry of ISOs does not change the results.
Two-part tariﬀ for service outsourcing: We have focused on per-unit royalties for
service outsourcing by assuming that ﬁrm D oﬀers a per-unit service price r to perform
post-production services for ﬁrm F. The qualitative nature of our results would remain
unchanged under an alternative set-up in which ﬁrm D can oﬀer a two-part tariﬀ (R,r)
(R ≥ 0, r ≥ 0), where R denotes a ﬁxed fee and r denotes a per-unit royalty. In the
Outsourcing equilibrium, ﬁrm D chooses (R,r) to maximize its proﬁt b πD(r,t)+R subject
to b πF(r,t) − R = max[πNLF
F ,πFDI
F ]. That is, ﬁrm D chooses (R,r) so that ﬁrm F is
indiﬀerent between outsourcing services and performing them by itself. We have found
that R = 0 and r = ¯ r holds under a range of parameterizations.27 That is, given that
product market competition becomes weaker as the royalty rate r increases, there is
a range of parameterizations in which ﬁrm D oﬀers the maximum acceptable royalty
rate r = ¯ r and the zero ﬁxed fee even when a two-part tariﬀ is allowed. Also, even if
r = ¯ r does not hold and r < r and R > 0 holds in the equilibrium, a decrease in t can
still increase r and the qualitative nature of our results is unchanged under a range of
parameterizations.28
Cournot competition: Consider an alternative set-up in which ﬁrms compete against
each other by choosing quantities. Suppose that, in an Outsourcing subgame, ﬁrm D
increases the quantity of good D, holding the quantity of good F ﬁxed. This does not
aﬀect ﬁrm D’s proﬁt for performing post-production services for ﬁrm F since the quan-
tity of good F is ﬁxed. That is, unlike Bertrand competition, Cournot competition does
not capture the idea that, although ﬁrm D can increase the sales of its own product
by adopting a more aggressive strategy, such a strategy also reduces its proﬁt from per-
forming services for its rival ﬁrm. This in turn implies that, under Cournot competition,
service outsourcing does not weaken product market competition. Since this eﬀect is
the driving force of our main comparative statics results, our ﬁndings do not hold under
Cournot competition.
Speciﬁc tariﬀ: We have considered ad valorem tariﬀs, given their prevalence in the real
world. In the case of speciﬁc tariﬀs, it can be shown that the equilibrium service price
becomes independent of the tariﬀ rate with linear demands. With non-linear demand
functions, however, it can be shown that the qualitative nature of our results remains
27If the market size represented by a is large enough, then ∂{b πD(r,t) + b πF(r,t)}/∂r > 0 holds, which
in turn implies that R = 0 and r = ¯ r hold in the Outsourcing equilibrium.
28Firm D always oﬀers r > 0 because under Bertrand competition with diﬀerentiated products,
∂{b πD(r,t) + b πF(r,t)}/∂r > 0 necessarily holds at r = 0.
26unchanged in the case of speciﬁc tariﬀs.
The ﬁxed cost for service outsourcing: We have assumed that ﬁrm D incurs a ﬁxed
cost for service outsourcing, KD. If ﬁrm F incurs KD instead, its proﬁt in the Outsourc-
ing equilibrium (πOS
F ) is decreasing in KD and hence the maximum acceptable service
price, r, is also decreasing in KD. Although this changes the quantitative details of the
results, their qualitative nature remains unchanged. That is, product market competi-
tion becomes weaker in the Outsourcing equilibrium when ¯ r is suﬃciently high, and this
in turn leads to results analogous to Propositions 2 to 5 in a range of parameterizations.
Non-tariﬀ barriers: We can interpret t as a proxy for non-tariﬀ barriers rather than
a tariﬀ. Then a reduction in t results in the saving of real costs, which works in favor of
world welfare. We have found that WW(K0
F,t1) < WW(K0
F,t0) (where 0 ≤ t1 < t0 ≤ ¯ t)
can hold even in this case under a range of parameterizations, and hence Propositions
4 and 5 hold under the alternative interpretation of t. Also, domestic welfare can still
decrease when KF is reduced, and hence Propositions 6 and 7 hold even though the
domestic country does not earn tariﬀ revenue in this case.
5 Conclusion
Post-production services such as sales, distribution, and maintenance consist of an im-
portant subclass of services. Although the liberalization of the trade in goods has made
substantial progress through multilateral negotiations under GATT/WTO, the progress
of the liberalization in the service sector has been limited so far. In this paper, we have
uncovered a previously unnoticed importance of liberalization in the service sector by ex-
ploring an international duopoly model that captures the linkage between product market
competition and provision of post-production services. That is, we have found that the
trade liberalization of goods may have negative welfare eﬀects if it is not accompanied
by the liberalization of service FDI.
Trade liberalization reduces trade costs, and this intensiﬁes competition between a
foreign ﬁrm and a domestic ﬁrm in the product market. At the same time, when the for-
eign ﬁrm outsources post-production services, trade liberalization induces the domestic
ﬁrm to charge a higher service price to absorb a part of the foreign ﬁrm’s incremental
proﬁt due to lower trade costs. We have demonstrated that, if the foreign ﬁrm’s ﬁxed
cost of service FDI is relatively high, the latter negative welfare eﬀect overshadows the
former positive one so that trade liberalization hurts consumers and reduces world wel-
fare in a range of parameterizations. Importantly, this negative welfare eﬀect of trade
27liberalization is mitigated and eventually turned into a positive one as service FDI is
also liberalized. This is because a reduction in the ﬁxed cost of service FDI decreases
the price of service outsourcing that the foreign ﬁrm would accept. We have found that
the qualitative nature of the results remains unchanged under an alternative setup in
which, without the liberalization of service FDI, KF is endogenously determined by the
domestic government.
Our analysis has therefore indicated that the liberalization of service FDI is important
not only because it reduces per-unit costs of post-production services but also because it
recovers gains from trade liberalization in goods for both consumers and world welfare.
Making progress on the liberalization of service FDI under GATS is crucial to secure
positive welfare consequences of trade liberalization under GATT/WTO.
We oﬀer two ﬁnal remarks to conclude the paper. First, we comment on the diﬀerence
between post-production services and intermediate inputs in our framework. In our in-
ternational duopoly model, the foreign ﬁrm has an option of outsourcing post-production
services to its domestic rival or performing the services by itself in the domestic market.
It is possible to consider a model with an analogous logical structure in which post-
production services are replaced by intermediate inputs. For example, one can consider
a foreign ﬁrm that does not have the facilities to produce an intermediate input, and
can suppose that the foreign ﬁrm determines whether it procures the intermediate input
from its domestic rival or produces the input by building its own production facilities.
Since intermediate inputs are not services but goods, service FDI has no direct ef-
fects on the foreign ﬁrm’s make-or-buy decision. In contrast, the liberalization of service
FDI plays a critical role in our framework. That is, in order to perform post-production
services eﬀectively, the foreign ﬁrm needs to undertake service FDI and establish its
own service facilities in the domestic market because of the importance of proximity
to customers. In our analysis, the connection between production and post-production
services has yielded a novel policy implication that trade liberalization should be ac-
companied by the liberalization of service FDI to secure its positive welfare eﬀects. The
recent progress of trade liberalization is not yet accompanied by the suﬃcient progress
of liberalization of service FDI, and this reality has motivated us to study the connection
between production and post-production services in international contexts.29
29Also, since the liberalization of the trade in goods aﬀects the intermediate-goods market as well as the
ﬁnal-goods market, its policy implications may be diﬀerent between the model with intermediate inputs
and the model with post-production services. To the best of our knowledge, the model of intermediate
inputs as mentioned above has not been previously explored (see Chen, Ishikawa, and Yu (2004) for a
related analysis) and its investigation is left to future research.
28Second, given that imperfect competition in the product market is an important el-
ement of our analysis, one might argue that strengthening product market competition
could be a substitute for liberalizing service FDI. Suppose that the domestic govern-
ment has stimulated competition in the product market by inducing ﬁrms’ entry, and
consequently there are N (≥ 2) domestic ﬁrms. As we discussed in Subsection 4.2, the
liberalization of service FDI can still be critical in recovering gains from the trade liberal-
ization of goods, as long as the price for service outsourcing is determined by one-to-one
negotiations. Also, although the domestic government could induce the entry of some
independent service organizations, the liberalization of service FDI can still be critical
as discussed in Subsection 4.2.
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29Proof of Proposition 1
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satisﬁed, ﬁrm D oﬀers service outsourcing and ﬁrm F accepts the oﬀer. In this case,
the equilibrium is an OS equilibrium where the service price is set at r = b r(m,t) and it
is uniquely determined given m and t. Once the service price is determined, there is a
unique equilibrium in the product market. (ii) If KF < K0
F and KD < K00





D are satisﬁed, ﬁrm D oﬀers service outsourcing by setting
the service price at r = r and ﬁrm F accepts the oﬀer. In this case, the equilibrium
is an OS equilibrium where the service price and the equilibrium prices of products are
uniquely determined. (iii) If KF < K0
F and KD ≥ K0





D are satisﬁed, ﬁrm D does not oﬀer a service price and ﬁrm F makes service





D hold and the equilibrium is an NLF equilibrium since ﬁrm D does not
oﬀer a service price and ﬁrm F does not make service FDI. In all cases, the equilibrium
service price, the equilibrium prices of products, and the other endogenous variables are
uniquely determined for any given parameterization.
The discontinuity of K0
D at KF = K0
F
Suppose KF = K0
F so that πFDI
F = πNLF
F holds. Then, if ﬁrm D does not oﬀer a service
price r at stage 1, ﬁrm F makes service FDI, and hence ﬁrm D’s subsequent equilibrium
proﬁt is πFDI
D . Now suppose KF increases from KF = K0
F to KF = K0
F +  ( > 0)
so that πFDI
F < πNLF
F holds. Then, if ﬁrm D does not oﬀer a service price r, ﬁrm F
does not make service FDI, and hence ﬁrm D’s subsequent equilibrium proﬁt is πNLF
D .
Comparing ﬁrm D’s proﬁts in these two cases, we have πFDI
D < πNLF
D . That is, service
FDI reduces ﬁrm F’s per unit service cost, and this intensiﬁes the competition between
the two ﬁrms, lowering ﬁrm D’s proﬁt. Note that, since πNLF
F is independent of KF, the
maximum acceptable service price ¯ r, determined by b πF(¯ r,t) = max[πNLF
F ,πFDI
F ], is also
independent of KF for all KF ≥ K0
F. Then, since K0
D is determined by b πD(¯ r,t)|KD=K0
D =
πFDI
D if KF = K0
F and b πD(¯ r,t)|KD=K0
D = πNLF
D if KF > K0
F where b πD(¯ r,t) is continuous
and strictly decreasing in KD, πFDI
D < πNLF





31when  approaches to zero. This results in the discontinuity.
Proof of Corollary 1
Suppose 0 < KD < K0
D and KF ≥ K0
F are satisﬁed given t. By Proposition 1, the
equilibrium is an OS equilibrium. Since we restrict our attention to the case where
∂b πD(r,t)/∂r > 0 is satisﬁed, and ∂b r0 (KF,t)/∂KF > 0 holds by (16), ∂πD/∂KF > 0
holds for 0 < KF < K0
F. Besides that, since πFDI
F = πNLF
F holds at KF = K0
F, we have
b r(m,t) = b r0 (KF,t) at KF = K0
F, and thereby πOS
D = b πD(b r(m,t),t) = b πD(b r0 (K0
F,t),t) is












D is increasing in KF by (A1) and K00
D|KF=0 =
0, given KD < K00
D|KF=K0
F, there exists K00
F such that KD < K00
D for K00
F < KF < K0
F
and K00
D < KD for 0 ≤ KF ≤ K00
F.
Proof of Lemma 3
By (9), (10), and (17), given KF ≥ K0
F and KD < K0
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It can be veriﬁed that ∂ζ0/∂b > 0, ∂ζ00/∂b > 0, ∂ζ0/∂t < 0, and ∂ζ00/∂t < 0, and thereby
the sign of ∂pOS
i /∂t is more likely to be negative when b is large and t is small, and c/m
is relatively small. Beside that, since




2{(2 − b2)t + 2(1 − b2)}2 > 0,
a decrease in t is less likely to increase pOS
F than pOS
D . Sinceζ0|t=0 > 0 ⇐⇒ b > b0 ≡
√
10/5, ζ00|t=0 > 0 ⇐⇒ b > b00 ≡
p√
13 − 3 (>
√
10/5), ζ0|b=1 > 0 ⇐⇒ t < t0 ≡
√
3,





D increases with a tariﬀ reduction if and
only if t < t0, b > b0, and c/m < ζ0 hold, and the prices of both goods increase with a
tariﬀ reduction if and only if t < t00, b > b00, and c/m < ζ00 hold.
Proof of Proposition 2
First note that consumer surplus is decreasing in both pD and pF. By (13), ∂πOS
D /∂pD =
2(pOS
D −c)−br = 2(2 + b){a−(1 − b)c}+b{2(1 + t)+b2}r > 0 and ∂πOS
D /∂pF = r > 0
hold. Since we focus on the case where ∂ˆ πD(r,t)/∂t > 0 holds and ∂r/∂t = ∂b r(m,t)/∂t <
0 is satisﬁed at KF = K0
F, ∂πD(KF,t)/∂t < 0 holds whenever both ∂pD/∂t < 0 and
∂pD/∂t < 0 hold. Beside that, since tariﬀ revenue is a transfer from ﬁrm F to the
domestic country, and a decrease in consumer surplus always outweighs ﬁrms’ gains
from increases in goods’ prices, the world welfare is also decreasing in pD and pF.
By Lemma 3, if t < t00, b > b00, and c/m < ζ00 are satisﬁed, ∂pD/∂t < ∂pF/∂t < 0
holds and thereby ∂CS(KF,t)/∂t > 0, ∂CS(KF,t)/∂t > 0, and ∂πD(KF,t)/∂t < 0
necessarily hold. Besides that, Lemma 3 suggests that ∂pD/∂t < 0 holds if and only if
t < t0, b > b0, and c/m < ζ0 are satisﬁed, and ∂pD/∂t < ∂pF/∂t < 0 holds only if t < t0,
b > b0, and c/m < ζ0 are satisﬁed. Since ∂CS(KF,t)/∂t > 0 and ∂WW(KF,t)/∂t > 0
can hold only if ∂pD/∂t < 0 is satisﬁed, they hold only if t < t0, b > b0, and c/m < ζ0 are
satisﬁed. As for ∂πD(KF,t)/∂t, it can be negative even if t < t0, b > b0, and c/m < ζ0
are not satisﬁed and ∂pF/∂t > ∂pD/∂t > 0 holds, since an increase in the service price
by a tariﬀ reduction directly increases the proﬁts of ﬁrm D.
Proof of Proposition 3
When KF ≤ K00
F holds, the equilibrium is an FDI equilibrium where the prices of goods,
consumer surplus, and the proﬁts of ﬁrm D are independent of KF. An increase in
KF reduces world welfare, because KF is incurred by ﬁrm F under the FDI equilib-
rium. Hence, ∂CS(KF,t)/∂KF = 0, ∂WW(KF,t)/∂KF = ∂πF(KF,t)/∂KF < 0 and
∂πD(KF,t)/∂KF = 0 hold for all KF < K00
F. When KF ∈ (K00
F,K0
F) holds, the equi-
librium is an OS equilibrium where the service price is set at r = b r0 (KF,t) and it
is increasing in KF. Given t, an increase in r necessarily raises the prices of both
goods, and so ∂CS(KF,t)/∂KF < 0, ∂WW(KF,t)/∂KF < 0, ∂πF(KF,t)/∂KF < 0,
and ∂πD(KF,t)/∂KF > 0 hold for all KF ∈ (K00
F,K0
F) where the last inequality is
due to ∂b πD(r,t)/∂r > 0. When KF > K0
F holds, the equilibrium is an OS equi-
librium where the service price is set at r = b r(m,t) and it is independent of KF.
33Hence, ∂CS(KF,t)/∂KF = 0, ∂WW(KF,t)/∂KF = 0, ∂πF(KF,t)/∂KF = 0, and
∂πD(KF,t)/∂KF = 0 hold for all KF > K0
F.
By comparing the equilibrium prices between an FDI equilibrium and an OS equilib-
rium, we have b pD (r,t) − pFDI
D = (3 + t)br/(4 − b2) > 0, b pF (r,t) − pFDI
F = [{2(1 + t) +
b2}r + 2ct]/(4 − b2) > 0. In addition, b r(KF,t) ≤ b r(m,t) holds for KF ∈ (K00
F,K0
F]
with equality at KF = K0
F. Hence, for given t and any KF1, KF2, and KF3 such that
0 < KF3 < K00
F < KF2 < K0
F < KF1 < K0
F, CS(KF3,t) > CS(KF2,t) > CS(KF1,t),
WW(KF3,t) > WW(KF2,t) > WW(KF2,t), πF(KF3,t) > πF(KF2,t) > πF(KF2,t),
and πD(KF3,t) < πD(KF2,t) < πD(KF1,t) hold. In sum, for any given t ∈ [0,¯ t],
CS(KF,t), WW(KF,t), and πF(KF,t) are decreasing in KF while πD(KF,t) is increas-
ing in KF for all KF ∈ (0,K0
F].
Proof of Proposition 4
Firstly, we should note that pOS
i > pFDI
i (i ∈ {D,F}) always holds and thereby CSFDI >





F ) = (CSFDI−CSOS)+(TRFDI−
TROS) holds at KF = K0





F hold at KF = K00
F. We have ∂{(CSFDI −CSOS)+(TRFDI −TROS)}/∂a =
[r{(1 + b)(2 + b) + 2
 
2 + 2b − b2
t +
 
2 + b − b2
t2}]/{(2 − b)
2 (2 + b)(t + 1)} > 0. By
using this and a > c + r, the following inequality holds: (CSFDI − CSOS) + (TRFDI −







b2)2} > 0 where Z3 = 2(1 + b)(2 + b)2bc + 2(4 + 8b + 5b2 + b4)ct + 2(8 + 4b − b3)ct2 +
2(4 − b2)t3c > 0 and Z4 = (1 + b)(4 + 12b − 3b2 + 5b3) + (12 + 24b + b2 − 4b3 + 3b4)t +
(12 + 8b − b2 − 2b3)t2 + (4 − b2)t3 > 0. As a result, WWFDI > WWOS is satisﬁed at
KF = K0
F and given t.
Secondly, we should examine the cut-oﬀ values of the ﬁxed investment cost of service
FDI before and after the trade liberalization. Since both K0
F and K00
F depend on t, we
denote them by K0
F(t) and K00
F(t) respectively for expositional convenience from here on.
While K0




F(t1) always holds (see
the proof of Proposition 1), it is ambiguous whether K00




D can be either increasing or decreasing in t.
Now we explore the existence of the unique cut-oﬀ values ˜ KCS
F and ˜ KWW
F such
that CS(KF,t1) > CS(KF,t0) holds if KF < ˜ KCS
F and WW(KF,t1) > WW(KF,t0)
holds if KF < ˜ KWW
F . When KF ≤ K00
F := min[K00
F(t0),K00
F(t1)] holds, the equilibrium
becomes an FDI equilibrium at both t = t0 and t = t1. Since we have K00
F(t) > 0 given
34KD > 0, we can always ﬁnd some KF such that this inequality holds irrespective of the
parameter values. As long as KF ≤ K00
F, CS(KF,t1) > CS(KF,t0) and WW(KF,t1) >
WW(KF,t0) always hold (see Proposition 5). Thus, the cut-oﬀ values must satisfy
˜ KCS
F ≥ K00
F and ˜ KWW
F ≥ K00
F.
Next consider the case where K00





two cases: (i) K00
F(t1) < K00
F(t0) and (ii) K00
F(t0) < K00
F(t1). (i) Suppose K00
F(t1) < K00
F(t0)
holds. If KF increases from KF = K00
F(t1) to KF = K00
F(t1) + ε (≤ K00
F(t0)) where
ε is an inﬁnitesimal value (ε > 0), the equilibrium at t = t1 changes from an FDI
equilibrium to an OS equilibrium, and the change necessarily lowers consumer surplus
and world welfare for given t. Note that under an OS equilibrium with KF < K0
F,
any increase in KF reduces consumer surplus as well as world welfare (see Proposi-
tion 3). There are two sub-cases: (a) If CS(K00
F(t1) + ε,t1) < CS(K00
F(t1) + ε,t0)
holds, the cut oﬀ value is determined by ˜ KCS
F = K00





F(t1)+ε,t0) holds, (b) if CS(K00
F(t1)+ε,t1) ≥
CS(K00
F(t1) + ε,t0) and CS(K00
F(t0),t1) < CS(K00




F(t0)) such that CS( ˜ KCS
F ,t1) = CS( ˜ KCS
F ,t0) holds. Similarly,
there exists ˜ KWW
F ∈ (K00
F(t1),K00
F(t0)) such that WW( ˜ KWW
F ,t1) = WW( ˜ KWW
F ,t0) holds
if WW(K00
F(t1) + ε,t1) ≥ WW(K00
F(t1) + ε,t0) and WW(K00
F(t0),t1) < WW(K00
F(t0),t0)
are satisﬁed. (c) Otherwise, neither ˜ KCS
F nor ˜ KWW





F(t0) holds. Since CS(KF,t1) > CS(KF,t0) and WW(KF,t1)
> WW(KF,t0) necessarily hold for KF ∈ (K00
F(t0),K00
F(t1)), neither ˜ KCS
F nor ˜ KWW
F ex-
ists in KF ∈ (K00
F(t0),K00






We have seen that ˜ KCS
F does not exist in KF ∈ [0,K
00







F,t0) hold. Then, let us consider the case for K
00
F ≤
KF. Suppose KF increases from KF = K
00
F to KF = K
00
F +ε (≤ K0
F(t0)). Then the equi-

















holds in this case. By the same reason, ˜ KWW
F > K
00




F(t1) holds. In this case, CS(K
00
F + ε,t1) < CS(K
00
F + ε,t0) can be satisﬁed
since CS(K00
F(t0),t1) > CS(K00
F(t0) + ε,t1) and CS(K00
F(t0),t0) ≈ CS(K00
F(t0) + ε,t0).
If it is satisﬁed, then we obtain ˜ KCS
F = K
00








F+ε,t0) is satisﬁed. Otherwise, ˜ KCS
F > K
00







F +ε,t1) > CS(K
00
F +ε,t0), a further increase in KF from KF = K
00
F +ε




reduces only CS(KF,t1) and does not aﬀect CS(KF,t0) for KF ∈ (K0
F(t0),K0
F(t1)].
Because we have considered the parameterizations in which CS(K0
F,t1) < CS(K0
F,t0)
hold, there necessarily exists ˜ KCS
F in the range K
00




F cannot exceed K0
F(t1) since both CS(KF,t1) and CS(KF,t0) are independent of








F + ε,t1) > WW(K
00










CS(KF,t1) > CS(KF,t0) for all KF ∈ (0, ˜ KCS




such that WW(KF,t1) > WW(KF,t0) for all KF ∈ (0, ˜ KWW
F ).
To prove K00
F(t1) < ˜ KCS
F and K00
F(t1) < ˜ KWW
F can hold under a range of param-
eterizations, we provide a numerical example. Parameters are set at a = 5, b = 0.9,
c = 0.5, m = 1.5, KD = 0.01, and K0
F = 5. We consider trade liberalization in which
the import tariﬀ is reduced from t0 = 0.8 to t1 = 0. The parameterization is consistent
with ∂b πD(r,t)/∂r > 0 for r ∈ [0,r] and positive sales of the two ﬁrms in any equilibrium.
Under these parameterizations, we have K0
F(t0) = 4.3055 < K0
F(t1) = 4.7229. Since
K0
F = 5 > max[K0
F(t0),K0
F(t1)] holds, we have K0
D|t=t0 = 15.375 < K0
D|t=t1 = 30.279.
Given KD = 0.01 < min[K0
D|t=t0 , K0
D|t=t1], the pre-liberalization equilibrium is an OS
equilibrium with KF > K0
F. It is calculated that K00
F(t1) = 0.01324 < K00
F(t0) = 0.01915.
We can calculate that (i) CS(KF,t1)−CS(KF,t0) = −7.934 < 0 holds, (ii) CS(KF,t1) =
CS(KF,t0) holds at KF = 0.92121 (< K0
F(t0)), (iii) CS(KF,t1) − CS(KF,t0) = 5.5131
√
206.07 − 10.176KF − 5.156
√
192.63 − 18.317KF − (5.9482 + 3.2686KF) > 0 holds for
KF ∈ (K00





206.07 − 10.176KF − 292.0 > 0 holds for KF ∈ (K00
F(t1),K00
F(t0)],
(v) CS(KF,t1) − CS(KF,t0) = 1.624 holds for KF ∈ [0,K00
F(t0)]. Thus, we have
˜ KCS
F = 0.92121 which satisﬁes ˜ KCS
F > K00
F(t1).
Similarly, we can calculate that (i) WW(K0
F,t1) − WW(K0
F,t0) = −1.1207 < 0,
(ii) WW(KF,t1) = WW(KF,t0) at KF = 1.1896 (< K0
F(t0)), (iii) WW(KF,t1) −
WW(KF,t0) = −3.9653
√
192.63 − 18.317KF + 16.987
√
206.07 − 10.176KF − 188.64 +
3.2689KF > 0 for KF ∈ (K00
F(t0),1.1896), (iv) WW(KF,t1)−WW(KF,t0) = −243.77+
6.296KF + 16.987
√
206.07 − 10.176KF > 0 holds for KF ∈ (K00
F(t1),K00
F(t0)], and (v)
WW(KF,t1) − WW(KF,t0) = 0.17598 holds for KF ∈ [0,K00
F(t1)]. Thus, we have
˜ KWW
F = 1.1896 which satisﬁes ˜ KWW
F > K00
F(t1).
36Proof of Proposition 5







4 − b22, and it is positive by Assumption 1. Similarly, by dif-
ferentiating πFDI
D , and WWFDI with respect to t, we obtain dπFDI
D /dt = 2bc[(2 + b){a−
(1 − b)c} + bct]/
 
4 − b22 > 0 and dWWFDI/dt = −c[(1 − b)(2 + b)





4 − b22 < 0.
Proof of Proposition 6
To prove the proposition, the basic parameters are set at the same values used in the
proof of Proposition 5: a = 5, b = 0.9, c = 0.5, m = 1.5. In addition, we set V = 100 and
KD = 1. The value of V does not aﬀect the ranking of each surplus nor the optimum level
of KF. We consider trade liberalization in which the import tariﬀ is reduced from t0 = 0.5
to t1 = 0.4. Under the parameterizations, we have K0
F(t0) = 4.3055 < K0
F(t1) = 4.7229.
For KF > K0
F(t), KD = 1 < K0
D|t=t0 = 17.734 < K0
D|t=t1 = 18.915 holds and thereby
the equilibrium is an OS equilibrium. For KF ≤ K0
F, by solving πOS
D = πFDI
D for KF, we
have K00
F(t1) = 0.18697 < K00
F(t0) = 0.19246. Hence, the equilibrium is an OS equilibrium
if K00
F(t) < KF ≤ K0
F(t) and an FDI equilibrium if 0 ≤ KF ≤ K00
F(t).
Given t, the domestic government maximizes W(KF,t) with respect to KF. Suppose
t = t0. We have W (KF,t0) = 7.2581 + 3.2373KF + 5.1709
√
197.61 − 15.264KF for
KF ∈ (K00
F(t0),K0
F(t0)]. We can verify that W (KF,t0) is an inverse U-shaped curve in
KF for this range, which takes the maximum at ˆ K0
F = 3.2108. Thus, the maximized level
of the domestic welfare under KF ∈ (K00
F(t0),K0
F(t0)] becomes W( ˆ K0
F,t0) = 80.686. In
other cases, the domestic welfare is independent of KF and it is given by W (KF,t0) =
76.805 (< W( ˆ K0
F,t0)) for KF ∈ (K0
F(t0),+∞) and W (KF,t0) = 79.947 (< W( ˆ K0
F,t0))
for KF ∈ [0,K00
F(t0)]. Accordingly, W (KF,t0) is maximized at KF = ˆ K0
F and thereby
K∗
F(t0) = ˆ K0
F.
Similarly, suppose t = t1. We have W (KF,t1) = −4.2261 + 3.3998KF + 5.8901
√
199.29 − 14.247KF for KF ∈ (K00
F(t1),K0
F(t1)], which is an inverse U-shaped curve in
KF for this range. It takes the maximum at ˆ K1
F = 3.2964 and the maximized level of the
domestic welfare under KF ∈ (K00
F(t1),K0
F(t1)] becomes W( ˆ K1
F,t1) = 79.678. In other
cases, the domestic welfare is independent of KF and it is given by W (KF,t1) = 79.553
(< W( ˆ K1
F,t1)) for KF ∈ (K0
F(t1),+∞) and W (KF,t1) = 78.926 (< W( ˆ K1
F,t1)) for
KF ∈ [0,K00
F(t1)]. Accordingly, W (KF,t1) is maximized at KF = ˆ K1
F and thereby
K∗
F(t1) = ˆ K1
F. Note that K∗
F(t1) > K∗
F(t0) means the tariﬀ reduction increases, rather
37than decreases, the optimum level of KF in this case.
By substituting KF = K∗
F(t0) and KF = K∗
F(t1) into CS(KF,t) and WW(KF,t),
we have CS(K∗
F(t1),t1) − CS(K∗
F(t0),t0) = −0.50163 < 0 and WW(K∗
F(t1),t1) −
WW(K∗
F(t0),t0) = −0.051217 < 0.






satisﬁed. These inequalities hold only if the equilibrium under KF = K∗
F(t1) is an
Outsourcing equilibrium. Since ∂CS(KF,t1)/∂KF ≤ 0 and ∂WW(KF,t1)/∂KF ≤ 0
hold (see Proposition 3), we have CS(KF,t1) < CS(K∗
F(t0),t0) and WW(KF,t1) <
WW(K∗
F(t0),t0) for all KF ≥ K∗
F(t1). For KF ∈ [0,K00
F(t1)], the post-liberalization
equilibrium becomes an FDI equilibrium and thereby CS(KF,t1) > CS(K∗
F(t0),t0)
and WW(KF,t1) > WW(K∗
F(t0),t0) necessarily hold. If KF increases from KF =
K00
F(t1) to KF = K00
F(t1) + ε and CS(K00
F(t1) + ε,t1) < CS(K∗
F(t0),t0) holds where ε
is an inﬁnitesimal value (ε > 0), we have ˆ KCS
F = K00
F(t1). If CS(K00
F(t1) + ε,t1) ≥
CS(K∗





F(t0),t0) holds at KF = ˆ KCS
F and CS(KF,t1) > CS(K∗
F(t0),t0)
holds for all KF ∈ (K00
F(t1), ˆ KCS




F(t1) + ε,t1) < WW(K∗





F(t1) < ˆ KCS
F and K00
F(t1) < ˆ KWW
F can hold under a range of parameteri-




199.29 − 14.247KF −14.117)2+10.957
√
199.29 − 14.247KF −136.26 and WW(KF,t1)−WW(K∗
F(t0),t0) = 2.3997KF +5.8902
√
−14.247KF + 199.29 − 80.660. We have ˆ KCS
F = 3.2131 > K00
F(t1) = 0.18697 where
CS(KF,t1) = CS(K∗
F(t0),t0) holds at KF = ˆ KCS
F and CS(KF.t1) > CS(K∗
F(t0),t0)
holds for all KF ∈ [0, ˆ KCS
F ). Similarly, we have ˆ KWW
F = 3.2446 > K00
F(t1) where
WW(KF,t1) = WW(K∗
F(t0),t0) holds at KF = ˆ KWW
F and WW(KF,t1) > WW(K∗
F(t0),t0)
holds for all KF ∈ [0, ˆ KWW
F ).
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